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The need for secrecy and security is essential in communication. Secret sharing is a conventional protocol to
distribute a secret message to a group of parties, who cannot access it individually but need to cooperate in order
to decode it. While several variants of this protocol have been investigated, including realizations using quantum
systems, the security of quantum secret sharing schemes still remains unproven almost two decades after their
original conception. Here we establish an unconditional security proof for continuous variable entanglement-
based quantum secret sharing schemes, in the limit of asymptotic keys and for an arbitrary number of players.
We tackle the problem by resorting to the recently developed one-sided device-independent approach to quan-
tum key distribution. We demonstrate theoretically the feasibility of our scheme, which can be implemented by
Gaussian states and homodyne measurements, with no need for ideal single-photon sources or quantum memo-
ries. Our results contribute to validating quantum secret sharing as a viable primitive for quantum technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing [1, 2] is a task where a dealer sends a secret
S to n (possibly, dishonest) players so that the cooperation
of a minimum of k ≤ n players is required to decode the se-
cret. Protocols that accomplish this are called (k, n)-threshold
schemes. The need for such a task appears naturally in many
situations, from children’s games and online chats, to banking,
industry, and military security: the secret message cannot be
entrusted to any individual, but coordinated action is required
to decrypt it in order to prevent wrongdoings.
For the classical implementation of the simplest (2, 2)-
threshold scheme, Alice, the dealer, encodes her secret into
a binary string S and adds to it a random string R of the same
length, resulting into the coded cypher C = S ⊕ R, where “⊕”
denotes addition modulo 2. She then sends R and C respec-
tively to the players Bob and Charlie. While the individual
parts R and C carry no information about the secret, only by
collaboration the players can recover S adding their strings to-
gether: R ⊕C = S . General (k, n)-threshold classical schemes
are a bit more involved. Such protocols, however, face the
same problem as any other classical key distribution protocol:
eavesdropping. An eavesdropper, Eve, or even a dishonest
player, can intercept the transmission and copy the parts sent
from the dealer to the players, thus accessing the secret.
An obvious way to proceed would be for Alice to first
employ standard two-party quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocols [3], to establish separate secure secret keys with
Bob and Charlie, then implement the classical procedure to
split the secret S into parts R and C, and use the obtained
secret keys to securely transmit these parts to each player.
The advantage of this protocol, which we call parallel-QKD
(pQKD), is that it exploits unconditional security offered by
the well-studied two-party QKD against eavesdropping and,
very importantly, that it can be unconditionally secure against
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any possible dishonest actions of the players. However,
pQKD can be demanding in terms of resources, as for a gen-
eral (k, n) scenario it requires the implementation of n distinct
QKD protocols plus the classical procedure to split the secret
[1], thus becoming less efficient with increasing n.
An alternative proposal to cope with these difficulties lies
in so-called quantum secret sharing [4] (QSS) — alias quan-
tum sharing of a classical secret, distinct from quantum state
sharing [5, 6], in which the secret is a quantum state rather
than a classical message — which allows for implementing a
(k, n)-threshold scheme supported by a single classical post-
processing, regardless of the number of players n. Unfortu-
nately, as we shall see below, there exists no provably secure
QSS scheme at the moment that enjoys the unconditional se-
curity of pQKD against both eavesdropping and dishonesty.
Hillery, Buzˇek, and Berthiaume [4] (HBB, for short) pro-
posed the first (2,2)- and (3,3)-threshold QSS schemes that
use multipartite entanglement to split the classical secret, and
protect it from eavesdropping and dishonest players in a single
go. Various other entanglement-based (HBB-type) schemes
have been proposed [7–14], some being more economic in the
required multipartite entanglement [15, 16], while others al-
lowing for more general (k, n)-threshold schemes [17–21]. A
different entanglement-based QSS scheme has also been pro-
posed, where entangled states are directly used as secure car-
riers and splitters of information [22]. A few experimental
demonstrations have been reported as well [16, 23–25]. The
security of all current schemes, however, is limited to either
plain external eavesdropping unrealistically assuming honest
players, or limited types of attacks by eavesdroppers and dis-
honest participants, yet sharing ideally pure maximally entan-
gled states. Furthermore, all such schemes are vulnerable to
participant attack and cheating [7, 26, 27], and no method is
currently known to deal with such conspiracies in general, not
even in the ideal case of pure shared states.
Zhang, Li, and Man [28] proposed the first (n,n)-threshold
scheme that required no entanglement and was claimed to be
unconditionally secure. Although it required perfect single
photon sources and quantum memories (rendering it impracti-
cal for current technology), it was later shown to be vulnerable
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2to various participant attacks [29, 30]. In the same category of
entanglement-free QSS schemes, Schmid et al. proposed a
protocol based on a single photon [31]; although originally
claimed to be unconditionally secure, it was also shown to be
vulnerable to participant attacks [32–35]. Alternative schemes
can be devised to deal with particular attacks [29, 30, 32, 33],
however there currently exists no rigorous method against ar-
bitrary participant attacks.
To sum up, almost two decades after the conception of QSS,
no existing scheme (with or without entanglement) has been
proven unconditionally secure against cheating of dishonest
players. Hence any practical implementation of secure se-
cret sharing needs to resort to conventional pQKD, while QSS
schemes only served so far as a theoretical curiosity.
In this article, we consider a continuous variable version
of an HBB-type scheme. We determine conditions on the
extracted key rate for the secret to be unconditionally se-
cure against both external eavesdropping and arbitrary cheat-
ing strategies of dishonest participants, in the limit of asymp-
totic keys, independently of the shared state, and for arbitrary
(k, n)-threshold schemes. The central idea in our approach, to
rigorously deal with arbitrary cheating strategies, is to treat the
measurements announced by the players as an input/output of
an uncharacterized measuring device (black box), analogously
to how (possibly, hacked) measuring devices are treated in
device-independent QKD [36]. In practice, this translates into
making no assumption about the origin of the players’ (possi-
bly, faked) announced measurements, in contrast to previous
QSS approaches that considered the players’ actions as trusted
thus suffering from cheating strategies. The dealer, on the
other hand, is regarded as a trusted party with trusted devices,
which is a natural assumption for this task. At variance with
device-independent QKD, where the devices are untrusted, for
the QSS task we treat the players themselves as untrusted, in-
dependently of their devices. Therefore the framework estab-
lished in this article, which makes no assumptions about the
players’ measurements, allows us to prove security against
general attacks of eavesdroppers and/or of dishonest play-
ers. This is achieved by making a sharp connection with, and
extending all the tools of, the recently developed one-sided
device-independent QKD (1sDI-QKD) [37], in particular for
continuous variable systems [38], which has been proven un-
conditionally secure in the limit of asymptotic keys. However,
the approach introduced here is general and can be adapted to
derive security proofs for discrete variable QSS schemes as
well as in the regime of finite keys [39].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present
our continuous variable QSS protocol, focusing on the (2, 2)-
threshold case. In Section III we provide a proof of its un-
conditional security, adopting techniques from the 1sDI-QKD
paradigm. In Section IV we present extensions to (k, n)-
threshold schemes and analyze the experimental feasibility of
our protocol. In Section V we summarize our work and dis-
cuss some future perspectives.
II. THE PROTOCOL
For illustration, we first focus on the (2, 2)-threshold
scheme. The trusted dealer Alice prepares a 3-mode con-
tinuous variable entangled state, keeps one mode and sends
the other modes to the untrusted players, Bob and Charlie,
through individual unknown quantum channels. Alice is as-
sumed to perform homodyne measurements of two canon-
ically conjugate quadratures, xˆA = (aˆ + aˆ†)/
√
2 and pˆA =
(aˆ − aˆ†)/i√2, on her mode, with corresponding outcomes
XA, PA, satisfying [xˆA, pˆA] = i (in natural units with ~ = 1).
Bob and Charlie, considered with uncharacterized devices, are
entitled to two unspecified measurements each, labelled by
xB(C), pB(C), with corresponding outcomes XB(C), PB(C). Noth-
ing is assumed about the origin of these measurements.
In our protocol, Alice’s goal is to establish a unique secret
key, not with Bob’s or Charlie’s individual measurements (as
in standard two-party QKD), but with a collective (non-local)
degree of freedom for Bob and Charlie, say X¯, that strongly
correlates with one of Alice’s quadratures, say XA. The unique
secret key can be accessed only when the players communi-
cate their local measurements, i.e., collaborate. For example,
if the three parties shared a maximally entangled state and
their outcomes were perfectly correlated as XA ' −XB + XC ,
one would choose X¯ = −XB + XC as such collective degree of
freedom.
Alice sends additional copies to Bob and Charlie, and each
time all parties randomly choose and measure their parts, get-
ting outcomes Xi, Pi respectively, with i = A, B,C, until they
have a sufficiently long list of correlated data. Afterwards, all
parties announce their measurement choice for each copy and
keep only the data originating from correlated measurements
(depending on the shared state). A random subset of this data,
chosen by the dealer, is then publicly revealed and used to es-
timate the size of the secret key (parameter estimation step
[40]) that will provide secure QSS (see below). Finally, if
the estimated key is non-zero, Alice proceeds to the conven-
tional classical post-processing steps of direct reconciliation
and privacy amplification [40] to create her final secret key,
and sends the encrypted secret to Bob and Charlie. However,
only when, and if, Bob and Charlie collaborate to form the
joint variable X¯, can they apply the post-processing instruc-
tions on X¯ to acquire Alice’s secret key. In what follows we
will derive conditions on the key rate to generate secret bits,
from the correlations of XA and X¯, that are unconditionally
secure against eavesdropping and dishonest participants.
III. SECURITY PROOF
A. Security against eavesdropping
Let us first study security against eavesdropping, following
the QKD work of Walk et al. [38]. Neglecting detector and
reconciliation efficiencies, the direct reconciliation asymptotic
secret key rate is known to be lower bounded by the Devetak-
3Winter formula [41],
K ≥ I(XA : X¯) − χ(XA : E), (1)
which finds many uses in quantum information and commu-
nication [36, 38, 40, 42–50]. Here
I(XA : X¯) = H(XA) − H(XA|X¯) (2)
is the classical mutual information between Alice’s variable
XA and the joint variable X¯, with H(X) = −
∫
dXp(X) log p(X)
being the Shannon entropy for a variable X with probability
distribution p(X), and
χ(XA : E) = S (E) −
∫
dXA p(XA) S (ρ
XA
E ) (3)
being the Holevo bound [51], which represents the maximum
possible knowledge an eavesdropper can get on the key. The
term S (E) = −Tr(ρE log ρE) is the von Neumann entropy of
Eve’s reduced state ρE , whereas ρ
XA
E denotes Eve’s state con-
ditioned on Alice’s measurement of xˆA with outcome XA. All
the logarithms in this paper are taken in base 2. All logarithms
in this paper are taken in base 2. A positive value of the right-
hand side of (1) implies security of the key against collective
attacks of the eavesdropper, and by virtue of Ref. [47] also
against general coherent attacks.
Defining the conditional von Neumann entropy
S (XA|E) = H(XA) +
∫
dXA p(XA) S (ρ
XA
E ) − S (E) , (4)
and the conditional Shannon entropy
H(XA|XB) =
∫
dXB p(XB)H(XA|xB = XB) , (5)
with H(XA|xB = XB) = −
∫
dXA p(XA|XB) log p(XA|XB), one
can recast the key rate (1) as a balance of conditional en-
tropies,
K ≥ S (XA|E) − H(XA|X¯). (6)
We can now use fundamental entropic uncertainty relations
that provide a lower bound to Eve’s uncertainty [45, 52–56],
S (XA|E) + S (PA|BC) ≥ log 2pi, (7)
for the derivation of which Alice’s canonical commutation
relations have been assumed, while Eve is assumed to pu-
rify the state shared by Alice, Bob and Charlie, i.e., ρABC =
TrE (|ΨABCE〉〈ΨABCE |). Substituting the uncertainty relation
(7) back into (6) and recalling that S (PA|BC) ≤ S (PA|P¯) =
H(PA|P¯) (since measurements cannot decrease the entropy),
where P¯ is a joint variable for Bob and Charlie optimally cor-
related with Alice’s momentum PA, we get
K ≥ log 2pi − H(XA|X¯) − H(PA|P¯) , (8)
i.e., a bound on the key rate (hence, on Eve’s maximal knowl-
edge on the key XA) only involving conditional Shannon en-
tropies, that can be estimated using the announced measure-
ment outcomes during the parameter estimation stage.
To make the bound even more accessible, we proceed to
express it only in terms of second moments, instead of deal-
ing with conditional probability distributions. For this aim,
we recall that the Shannon entropy of an arbitrary probabil-
ity distribution is maximized by a Gaussian distribution of
the same variance. In other words, H(XA|X¯) ≤ HG(XA|X¯) =
log
√
2pieVXA |X¯ , where
VXA |X¯ =
∫
dX¯p(X¯)
(
〈X2A〉X¯ − 〈XA〉2X¯
)
(9)
is the minimum inference variance of Alice’s position out-
come when the joint outcome X¯ is known; and similarly for
H(PA|P). The final key rate is then bounded as follows,
K ≥ − log
(
e
√
VXA |X¯VPA |P¯
)
. (10)
We see that a nonzero key rate (secure against eavesdropping)
can be achieved when EA|BC ≡ VXA |X¯VPA |P¯ < e−2.
B. Security against dishonesty
We derived conditions such that Alice’s key is secure from
eavesdropping and the players can safely obtain the key when-
ever they decide to collaborate. However, one needs to con-
sider also the potential cheating strategies of the players them-
selves.
Suppose now that Bob is a dishonest player. His goal would
be to guess Alice’s key (hence, access the secret) using solely
his own local measurements xB, pB, entirely bypassing the re-
quired collaboration with Charlie. A most general cheating
strategy for Bob would be: first, to secretly intercept Charlie’s
mode during its transmission using general coherent attacks
to increase his knowledge on Alice’s key; and second, to lie
about his measurements. A positive key rate in (10) does not
guarantee security against such general participant attacks and
cheating.
Here we derive additional conditions on the key rate so that
Bob cannot cheat or access the secret by himself. Our central
observation is to reconsider the Devetak-Winter formula (1)
and treat now Bob as an eavesdropper, together with Eve. This
means that in the Holevo bound χ(XA : E) defined in (3), that
expresses the knowledge of party E on the key XA, we will
include Bob himself. This leads to a modified Devetak-Winter
formula,
K ≥ I(XA : X¯) − χ(XA : EB), (11)
where EB refers now to the unknown joint quantum state of
Eve and Bob. A positive key rate in (11) would imply secu-
rity of Alice’s key against joint general attacks by Bob and
Eve on Charlie’s system. Also, Bob and Eve’s maximum
knowledge of the key, χ(XA : EB), can be upper bounded as
seen below using Alice and Charlie’s measurements, indepen-
dently of Bob’s (possibly, faked) announced measurements,
therefore providing security against Bob’s cheating. The un-
certainty relation that we will use to bound Bob and Eve’s
knowledge will be a slightly modified version of (7),
S (XA|EB) + S (PA|C) ≥ log 2pi. (12)
4Following similar steps as previously described, we thus end
up with the following novel bound on the key rate,
K ≥ − log
(
e
√
VXA |X¯VPA |PC
)
. (13)
Notice that the key rate bound in (13) is smaller than the one in
(10) that did not take dishonesty into account, due to VPA |P¯ ≤
VPA |PC , which is expected since the eavesdroppers’ knowledge
on the key is increased by including Bob together with Eve.
To intuitively understand why this condition prohibits any
cheating from Bob, we recall first that the key is generated
solely by the XA, X¯ outcomes. By examination of the uncer-
tainty relation (12), taking into account that log
√
2pieVPA |PC ≥
S (PA|C), we see that the better Charlie can estimate Alice’s
momentum (i.e., the smaller S (PA|C)) the larger Bob and
Eve’s ignorance should be on the key elements XA. The previ-
ous condition (10), not accounting for participant dishonesty,
only demanded that S (PA|BC) is small enough, which can be
true even if S (PA|C) is arbitrarily large, thus allowing Bob
to reach good knowledge of the key (i.e, small S (XA|EB)),
through (12).
We can also account for Charlie’s dishonesty in an exactly
analogous manner (just replace B↔ C above), leading us to
K ≥ − log
(
e
√
VXA |X¯VPA |PB
)
. (14)
Putting everything together, the final bound on the asymp-
totic key rate to provide unconditional security against general
attacks of an eavesdropper, and against arbitrary (individual)
cheating methods of both Bob and Charlie, which include the
announcement of faked measurements and general attacks of
Bob on Charlie’s system and of Charlie on Bob’s system, is:
K ≥ I(XA : X¯) −max{χ(XA : EB), χ(XA : EC)}
≥ − log
(
e
√
VXA |X¯ ·max{VPA |PC ,VPA |PB}
)
,
(15)
which is the minimum of the bounds (13) and (14). A positive
key rate (15) remarkably provides security against all kinds of
attacks that existing QSS protocols suffered from (e.g., fake
announced measurements [7], Trojan horse attacks [29], etc.),
for the sole reason that the players Bob and Charlie are not
assumed to be performing trusted quantum operations but are
treated as black boxes, in contrast to all previous schemes.
IV. DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
In Fig. 1 we demonstrate the feasibility of the protocol in a
concrete realization, where the key rate (15) is plotted against
the squeezing degree of a noisy tripartite entangled Gaus-
sian cluster state. Notice that the same key rate can also be
achieved by an equivalent protocol that solely requires bipar-
tite entanglement (that would represent the so-called prepare-
and-measure counterpart to the presented protocol, borrowing
a QKD terminology), thus further reducing the technological
requirements for the state preparation. More generally, given
the recent progress in the generation of large-scale continuous
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FIG. 1. The QSS secure key rate K, Eq. (15), is plotted against the
squeezing r of a 3-mode noisy Gaussian cluster state, obtained from
a pure state [20] UˆABUˆBC |r〉A|r〉B|r〉C , with Uˆi j = exp
(
Ωi j xˆi xˆ j
)
, after
Bob and Charlie’s modes undergo individual pure-loss channels (i.e.,
quantum-limited attenuating channels), each modelled by a beam
splitter with transmissivity T and zero excess noise (see inset). From
top to bottom, the curves correspond to T = 1, 0.95, 0.9, 0.85.
All parties are assumed to be performing homodyne measurements
of xˆi, pˆi, with i = A, B,C. The current experimentally accessible
squeezing is limited to r . 1.15 (10dB), or σ & 0.32 [57, 58], in
which regime a nonzero K is still guaranteed for sufficiently large T ,
demonstrating the feasibility of our scheme.
variable entangled states [59–65], we expect our secure pro-
tocol to be recognized as a competitive candidate for practical
QSS, in alternative to conventional pQKD.
Finally, we show how to generalize the secret key rate
bound (15) to any (k, n)-threshold QSS scheme. To start with,
let us denote the n players as B1, B2, . . . , Bn. A (k, n)-threshold
scheme has two requirements: first, no collaboration of any
k − 1 players should be able to access the secret. We incor-
porate this requirement into Eq. (15) by considering all pos-
sible combinations of k − 1 out of n players, the total num-
ber of which equals the binomial coefficient
(
n
k−1
)
, as poten-
tial collaborative eavesdroppers, and choosing the maximum
Holevo information over all collaborations to attain the max-
imum possible knowledge on the key by any of these groups.
Second, any collaboration of k players, known as the access
structure, should be able to decode the message. Let us at-
tribute a joint variable X¯i to each k-player collaboration corre-
lated to Alice’s XA, with i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
k
)
. This amounts to Alice
sending as much error-correction information as needed, such
that even the k-player collaboration least correlated to Alice,
i.e., with the smallest I(XA : X¯i), can access her key. Taking
the above into account, the key rate of the protocol will be,
K ≥ min {I(XA : X¯1), . . . , I(XA : X¯(nk))}
−max {χ(XA : ES 1), . . . , χ(XA : ES ( nk−1))}, (16)
where S i denotes a particular sequence of k − 1 players, e.g.,
S 1 = B1 · · · Bk−1. A positive value of the right-hand side of
Eq. (16) guarantees unconditional security of our QSS proto-
col against eavesdropping and arbitrary collaborative cheating
5strategies of any group of k − 1 potentially dishonest players.
This analysis readily extends to arbitrary access structures,
where a subset of privileged players can access the key.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a feasible entanglement-based continuous
variable QSS scheme, and derived sufficient conditions for the
protocol’s secret key rate to provide, for the first time, uncon-
ditional security of the dealer’s classical secret against general
attacks of an eavesdropper and arbitrary cheating strategies,
conspiracies and attacks of the (possibly, dishonest) players,
for all (k, n)-threshold schemes, and in the limit of asymptotic
keys.
In our approach, we crucially identified the most physically
relevant framework for QSS to be the 1sDI setting, treating
the dealer as a trusted party with characterized devices and
the players’ devices as black boxes. The natural separation
of roles between dealer and players renders QSS a well-suited
task for the 1sDI setting, even more than two-party QKD itself
[66]. At the same time, this observation enables us to adopt
and generalize conventional 1sDI-QKD techniques to estab-
lish security of entanglement-based QSS, as demonstrated in
this paper. Incidentally, while the resource behind 1sDI-QKD
is known to be (bipartite) steering [67], a quantum correla-
tion stronger than plain entanglement [68] and weaker than
Bell-nonlocality [69], one could suspect a similar connection
in the present multiuser scenario. In a companion paper [70],
we show in fact that multipartite steering [60, 71] empowers
secure QSS, providing an operational interpretation for a gen-
uine multipartite continuous variable steering measure.
Our work opens many avenues for further exploration. The
presented security proof rests on general principles and can be
extended from asymptotic to finite keys [39], suitable for con-
crete applications, and also to discrete variable systems, used
in the original QSS definition [4]; this will be the subject of
future work. Moreover, although we provided sufficient secu-
rity conditions for all (k, n)-threshold schemes, the identifica-
tion of optimal families of states maximizing the key rate for
each scheme was left open and will be addressed elsewhere.
Finally, our results pave the way for an unconditionally se-
cure experimental demonstration of QSS, enabling its use in
next-generation quantum communication networks.
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